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 Education, Religion and Identity among Uyghur Hostesses in Ürümchi 
 
Joanne Smith Finley  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I address identity constructions among a stigmatised group in urban 
Uyghur society: karaoke hostesses in Ürümchi. Research on hostess culture in 
contemporary China has focused on Han (majority group) hostesses in the cities of China 
proper, and explores socio-economic aspects of hostess work, including rural-urban 
inequalities and employment discrimination (Hershatter 1996; Xin 1999; Sun 2002; 
Zheng 2004, 2007; Jeffreys 2004); the re-emergence of gender asymmetry in reform 
China (Wang 2000; Sun 2002; Zheng 2006, 2008; Zhang 2011); health-related aspects of 
sex work (Gil et al. 1996; Zhang 2006); prostitution as a social threat (‘spiritual pollutant’) 
and the state’s attempts to regulate it (Jeffreys 1997, 2004; Wang 2000; Sun 2002; Zheng 
2009, 2010, 2011); and the link between hostessing and official corruption (Zhang 2006; 
Jeffreys 2008). Here, I consider the situations of five Uyghur (minority group) hostesses 
working in the politically contested border region of Xinjiang, and explore how these 
young women make sense of their social, religious and ethnic identities. When the act of 
playing hostess to a Han majority male is construed by the Uyghur community as 
‘immoral’ in religious terms,1 and ‘traitorous’ in ethno-political terms, how do these 
women explain their choices? From which linguistic and educational backgrounds do 
they hail? Are they predominantly minkaohan, i.e. young women educated in Mandarin 
Chinese, and more used to interaction with Han classmates and neighbours? Or are they 
minkaomin, i.e. Uyghur-educated, and less familiar with Han peers? How do they 
 2 
reconfigure notions of religious morality, ethnic identity and group loyalty? Data is 
drawn from ethnographic interviews conducted in Ürümchi in 2004. Interviews were 
conducted in the Uyghur language, or in a mixture of Uyghur and Chinese, as preferred 
by respondents. 
 
The hostess industry in Ürümchi 
Like their Han counterparts in China proper, Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi’s karaoke 
clubs (Ch. yezonghui) described two types of hostess (Ch. sanpei xiaojie)
2: those who ‘sit 
on stage’ (Ch. zuotai  – accompany the customer at the venue) and those who ‘go off 
stage’ (Ch. chutai – return with the customer to his hotel). Zuotai girls earned a basic fee 
of 100 yuan per customer, although several hundred yuan could be earned from clients of 
a favourable disposition. Usually, a zuotai girl would ‘sit’ with one customer for a 
maximum of three hours. Chutai girls earned a basic fee of between 500 and 1000 yuan, 
but had to pay around 20 per cent of this to their ‘PR manager’ (Ch. gongguan jingli). 
The manager connected girls with customers, and received a separate introduction fee 
from the client (cf. Xin 1999, 1427; Zheng 2008, 445).  
 
According to a Uyghur hotel employee in his thirties named Zunun, speaking in 2004, 
just a tiny percentage of Uyghur girls worked as hostesses in Ürümchi; yet he 
acknowledged that the number had increased since my previous field trip in 2002. 
Viewed against the community taboo on Uyghur-Han intermarriage, which operates as 
the principal form of symbolic resistance to Han encroachment (Smith Finley 2013a, 
2013b), what do we make of this seeming paradox? Does it signal the crumbling of ethnic 
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boundaries constructed by Uyghurs to separate themselves from Han Chinese and to 
express symbolic opposition to PRC political control? Or is it a new – and controversial - 
form of accommodation, given appeal by the promise of financial reward and enhanced 
social mobility? Finally, is this trend connected to the aggressive mainstreaming of the 
Chinese language and Chinese-medium education since 2002, and, if so, how? Below, I 
seek to answer these questions based on five case studies. 
 
Five case studies 
Mädinä (20, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi)  
Mädinä
3
 came from a broken family, and lived in an Ürümchi apartment with her 
grandfather, his second wife and a half-brother. Mädinä had a history of self-harm. Both 
her forearms were covered in scars, injuries she had inflicted on herself when her ‘old 
man’ (Ch. laogong; here, boyfriend) died from a heroin overdose. Mädinä first heard 
about the hostessing industry at the age of fifteen, when she ran away from home to 
Shanghai. Taking up residence at the home of a male Uyghur cousin, she was raped by 
his friend, then beaten by her cousin for ‘making him lose face’ (damaging his male 
honour). Mädinä subsequently fled with another of his friends, only to be beaten again 
when she had no choice but to return. It was then that a friend suggested she might 
support herself financially by becoming a hostess. 
 
In the beginning, Mädinä explained, she could not bring herself to do hostess work, since 
‘I’m a Uyghur, we believe in Islam.’ She confided that she had wanted to die after the 
rape took place, and contemplated committing suicide. While her sense of shame recalls 
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that commonly experienced by rape victims, regardless of religious background,  for 
Mädinä it was closely linked to the importance of female purity in Uyghur culture.
4
 
During her second sojourn in China proper, Mädinä had finally succumbed to hostess life. 
Describing how a client had given her a 1500 yuan tip in sympathy after she burst into 
tears one evening in a Kunming club, she laughed at the memory, impressed in retrospect 
by what now appeared a scam. Several years into the lifestyle, Mädinä was clear about 
the instrumental - and temporary - nature of her occupation: ‘This work isn’t forever; it 
will end one day. Then I will have a job, a good husband, and a home’. 
 
Mälikä (20, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi)  
Mälikä came from a one-parent family (father deceased). When her mother needed 
money to send Mälikä’s younger sister and brother to school, a friend had urged her to 
become a hostess.
5
 She described her dread at the prospect:  
 
I felt awful, ashamed of myself, like I was becoming two people. I was losing 
face in front of my best friend. I was terrified that I would be seen [entering a 
club] by people I knew, and I couldn’t bear that. Once people know that 
about you, you’re finished.   
 
Unable to face the associated stigma, Mälikä wrote a pile of suicide letters, tidied the 
house, and took an overdose. When this suicide attempt failed, she tried again. The third 
attempt followed her break-up with her Uyghur fiancé, when his parents obstructed the 
marriage on the grounds of Mälikä’s adverse family circumstances. This time, she slit her 
 5 
wrist.
6
 By the time of our interview, Mälikä would go for long periods without doing 
hostess work, resorting to a few nights’ here and there only when she ran into financial 
difficulties. She directed her earnings straight into her university fees, vowing that after 
graduation she would find a steady job (and a man with a steady job) and give up 
hostessing for good.  
 
Khalidä (18, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) 
Khalidä also came from a single-parent family (father deceased). Following the loss of 
the family head, her mother could not afford the tuition fees to send Khalidä’s elder 
brother to university in Shanghai. Having passed the university entrance exam, the 
disappointment of having to give up his place was hard for him to bear, and he became 
addicted to heroin, later requiring hospitalisation. Throughout our interviews, Khalidä 
referred to her brother’s medical condition as a ‘heart problem’, a euphemism frequently 
used for heroin abuse in Xinjiang, where the pathology claimed the lives of many 
disillusioned young men in the 1990s (Dautcher 2004). When Khalidä’s brother fell ill, 
staff at the First Affiliated Hospital of Xinjiang Medical University (Ch. Xinjiang yike 
daxue diyi fushu yiyuan新疆医科大学第一附属医院) refused to admit him unless 
medical costs were paid in advance.
7
 At that point, a Han schoolmate suggested she get 
work as a hostess, remarking that some customers would pay several thousand yuan for a 
virgin.  
 
Khalidä insisted in interview that she would never have entered such a club unless forced 
to by circumstance, and it is instructive that her first ‘off-stage’ experience was with a 
 6 
Uyghur – not Han - client. She periodically wept during the course of her narrative, 
reverting from Chinese to her mother tongue whenever distressed. Tragically, while her 
earnings had enabled the family to get medical treatment for her brother, he later died to 
in hospital. Khalidä continued: ‘Then I hated myself, hated everything, and wanted to die. 
I took a lot of pills and tried to kill myself.’ Unable to reveal the depth of her shame to 
her family, Khalidä told her mother that she had attempted suicide out of grief for her 
brother’s death. Her second ‘ off-stage’ experience was with a Han client. Initially 
refusing to go through with the sex act, she had endured a beating and then a rape, too 
inexperienced to know that she could request the manager’s help in such circumstances.  
 
Aminä (18, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) 
Aminä came from a broken family (parents divorced). Her mother had struggled 
financially, pinching a living out of sweeping the streets (a line of work Uyghurs are 
traditionally too embarrassed to undertake).
8
 Though Aminä had been accepted onto a 
course at the Xinjiang Medical University (Ch. Xinjiang yike daxue  新疆医科大学), she 
had found herself unable to pay the tuition fees, and had reluctantly become a hostess 
following an introduction by her friend, Khalidä (above). For Aminä, hostessing was a 
gruesome but necessary means to an end:  
 
Basically, you feel afraid. Because some customers are nasty. Most of all, you 
just want to get it over with and get off home as quickly as possible. You sit 
with the customer for 30 minutes, get your 50 yuan or whatever, and escape 
before he starts trying to maul you. 
 7 
 
Tunisa (22, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) 
Tunisa also hailed from a broken family (parents divorced). Following his remarriage, her 
father had failed to protect her from her step-mother’s hostility, with the result that she 
had fled to China proper at the age of seventeen. She described how she and ten other 
Uyghur girls were tricked into prostitution by domestic traffickers:  
 
We went to Ha’erbin by train with two Han managers. They said we would 
perform Uyghur dance in restaurants. But we overheard them talking 
privately on the phone, and realised they planned to sell us as prostitutes […] 
three of us were sold on for 2000 yuan each.  
 
Tunisa first slept with a Han client at eighteen. Learning first how to ‘sit on stage’, she 
was told almost immediately that she would also be expected to ‘go off stage’. In the first 
week, she slept with five or six Han men. When I asked how this had made her feel, she 
giggled nervously, covered her face in embarrassment, and replied: ‘I just lay there with 
my arm across my eyes. I felt sick, disgusted. Most of them were old men in their forties 
or fifties. And they stank of pork.’ Asked whether she would have felt differently if the 
clients were young and attractive, she responded in the negative: ‘Even the good-looking 
Han guys can’t compete with Uyghur guys [Uy. yätmäydu].’ 
 
Eventually, Tunisa and a companion were ‘rescued’ by a Uyghur client, who promised to 
help them. By pretending that the man’s wife was their estranged mother, who now 
wanted her daughters back, they were able to leave the club and went to stay at the 
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couple’s restaurant. The situation turned sour, however, when the couple tried to force 
them into arranged marriages, in an apparent bid to restore their ‘fallen honour’. Finding 
their way to a Hui restaurant in Tianjin, they once again took work as hostesses, this time 
for a Uyghur female manager. Tunisa described how in four months she was paid just 
1000 yuan. When she protested the poor conditions and threatened to return to Xinjiang, 
the manager demanded that she give the 1000 yuan back ‘to cover her board and lodging’. 
Subsequently, Tunisa and the other girls were forbidden to go outside, and became virtual 
prisoners in the restaurant. Later, the manager demanded that they make contact with 
friends in Xinjiang and help her recruit them as hostesses. On a second sojourn to China 
proper, Tunisa undertook hostess work together with Mädinä in Beijing.  
 
Motivations: labour market inequality or pathology?  
A key issue in studies of sex work is whether women get involved in prostitution because 
they are in economic need or because they want to make easy money: ‘Hostessing offers 
high incomes in the least amount of time’ (Zheng 2008, 445; cf. Jeffreys 1997, 53). In 
Ürümchi, the picture is mixed. Uyghur hostesses frequently blamed their line of work on 
adverse employment prospects for ethnic minorities in a Han-dominated urban labour 
market. Mädinä and Mälikä, both lacking a university degree, explained:  
 
Of course we don’t like the work! What a thought. We do it because we have 
to. You get fed up of being rejected by one company after another… it’s all 
private companies now, and they won’t take Uyghurs. Those who are best 
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educated – usually minkaohan [Chinese-educated Uyghurs] – have a better 
chance. Otherwise, [employers] aren’t interested.  
 
In a follow-up interview, Mädinä added: ‘We’re uneducated [Ch. meiyou wenhua]. 
Wherever we go, we’re told “We don’t want minorities! [Ch. Bu yao minzu!]”’. They 
described how some Uyghur women undertook hostessing as a second job in the 
evenings because their regular jobs did not pay enough, citing one hostess who worked in 
the People’s Courts by day. Jelil, a university graduate in his late twenties, confirmed this, 
observing: ‘There is no other way for them to eat. They can’t get [well-paid] jobs.’  
 
Financial difficulties resulting from ethnic discrimination in the urban labour market 
were often further complicated by difficult family backgrounds. All of my respondents 
hailed from one-parent families. As Mälikä explained, ‘Often, the girl’s father is dead, or 
the mother is dead. Or the parents are divorced, and there is a step-parent who doesn’t 
care for the child properly because he/she is not their own.’ In this way, young women 
lacking a family head or committed carer seem more likely to wander into hostessing. 
The same may be true for women who lack a supportive male partner, or who have 
previously suffered abuse at the hands of men. As Mädinä observed, ‘Why should I care 
about my self-respect if there is no relative, no man caring for me?’ [my emphasis]. This 
reading was confirmed by members of the urban community. Patigül, a CD trader in her 
early thirties, explained: ‘Most of these girls have come from troubled backgrounds. 
Either their parents are divorced …or they don’t have a mother or father. Or somehow 
they’ve ended up leaving home.’ It is perhaps significant to note that Mädinä had not 
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been willing to work as a hostess when her boyfriend was alive, that is, when she had 
someone close by who genuinely cared about her.
9
 At the time of our interview, Mädinä 
explained that her career goals rested entirely on the generation of capital through 
hostessing. With her accumulated earnings, she had so far been able to register for a 
computing course, and now she dreamed of saving enough to take driving lessons and 
buy a car: ‘Then I could set myself up as a private-hire driver.’ The gap between eking 
out a meagre subsistence and having disposable income that might be used to achieve 
social mobility is of crucial importance here. 
 
For Mälikä, it was necessary to endure hostess work in order to secure a better future for 
herself and her family. She explained earnestly how she had worked hard to fund her first 
year at university, but was then unable to pay advance tuition for her second year. When 
the university asked her to discontinue her studies, a friend introduced her to hostess 
work. She related: 
 
At first I was really reluctant; I felt I would be letting myself down … I didn’t 
know what to do, how to dance, sing. I ended up in floods of tears! But the 
guy still gave me 200 yuan – he felt sorry for me … Later, my friend said 
‘See how easy it was to make 200 yuan?’  
 
As Mälikä pointed out, since girls in higher education attend class by day, they need a job 
that does not require them to work during the day, or indeed every night, and this rules 
out employment in the service industries. Some female students therefore do hostess 
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work on Friday and Saturday nights, since there is no college the next day and students 
are therefore permitted to sleep off campus.  
 
For her part, Khalidä eventually came to see hostessing as a necessary evil, which 
would allow her to raise university tuition fees (10,000 yuan per year), to support 
her mother (an independent trader of insecure income), and to secure a good 
education for her two younger sisters. The social and religious stigma attached to 
the work had caused her to repeatedly lie to her mother about the origins of the 
extra funds. At the same time, however, she presented her decision as an ‘act of 
selfless love’, exercised in the name of familial devotion (filial virtue), an argument 
often forwarded by prostitutes across Asia, and which may sometimes gain a degree 
of sympathy from society (cf. Do 2006: 178; Lindquist 2010: 293).  
 
While all five girls claimed to have been forced into hostessing by circumstance, there 
were also indications that some had chosen to continue in the profession rather than enter 
the service industries. Generally, this was because of a disinclination to perform labour-
intensive work. When I met Mädinä, she had just given up a hotel job because it was ‘too 
tiring’ (Ch. tai lei). On another day, she described how she had worked briefly in a 
pharmacy before resigning: ‘It was exhausting; you had to stand on your feet all day!’ 
Mälikä and Mädinä admitted on separate occasions that some Uyghur girls ‘don’t like 
heavy or dirty work’, an attitude corroborated by respondents from the urban community. 
Ghäyrät, a migrant worker in his thirties from Aqsu, commented: ‘If a girl can’t earn 
money doing a light job, she ends up doing this [hostessing] instead’.10 Nonetheless, both 
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Mädinä and Mälikä insisted that a person could not make a ‘decent’ living by working a 
service job alone. 
 
A portion of Uyghur hostesses, having fallen into hostess work when in financial 
difficulty, subsequently get used to the lifestyle. As Mälikä observed, ‘They get used to 
the money coming easily. They get a spending habit, want new clothes, and can’t go back 
to having no disposable income.’ Mädinä similarly remarked: ‘Take me, I spend money 
like water … Girls want to wear nice clothes and eat well! [Ch. Yao chuan de hao, yao 
chi de hao!]’ This view too was reiterated among Uyghur members of the urban 
community. Though Patigül, a music trader in her early thirties, initially argued that such 
women were simply victims of employment discrimination, she later conceded that the 
city ‘had opportunities for everyone if they chose to take them’. Räwiä, a state employee 
in her forties, similarly remarked: ‘It’s rubbish to suggest that they can’t do other jobs! 
It’s just that they won’t.’  
 
Intra-group divides: social stigma and disassociation  
In China proper, the reform-era obsession with wealth accumulation and an increasingly 
liberalised attitude towards sex have meant that prostitution is less stigmatised among the 
majority Han than it once was (Xin 1999: 1428). The prevailing attitude is neatly 
encapsulated in the popular saying: ‘Laugh at a poor man rather than a prostitute’ (Ch. 
Xiao pin bu xiao chang  笑贫不笑娼). The same is not true for Uyghur communities in 
Xinjiang, where the involvement of daughters in the hostess industry is viewed with 
uniform horror.  
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The shame associated with the industry was brought into immediate relief by the way in 
which I first gained entry to that community. Observing a Uyghur prostitute meet a Han 
client in a city hotel one evening in 2002, I raised the issue of sex work with long-term 
respondent, Zunun, a male in his thirties born in Ürümchi. Zunun then revealed – with 
manifest discomfort - that his half-sister (whom I had known as a small child many years 
earlier) now worked as a hostess. Eager to speak to her, I was disappointed when Zunun 
was reluctant to arrange a meeting. It was only on a return trip in 2004 that I discovered 
the source of his reluctance: at no time had half- brother and -sister openly acknowledged 
to one another that he knew what she did for a living. The contentious issue had remained 
unspoken because, as Zunun sadly observed, he felt he had no right to intervene on behalf 
of the moral reputation of a half-sister. When he did finally set up a meeting, he did not 
broach the issue with his half-sister directly, but simply directed her to my hotel room, 
and implied that a simple conversation could earn her some money.
11
 Following our first 
interview, his half-sister had implored: ‘Please don’t say anything to my step-brother! In 
his heart, he knows what I do. And he knows that I know that he knows! But we would 
never voice it aloud.’  
 
While it is common for women in many parts of the world to conceal sex work from 
family members, an acute sense of social stigma caused Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi to 
go to extraordinary lengths to keep their ‘night work’ secret. This was because, as in 
other Islamic societies, community supervision is deployed among Uyghur communities 
in Xinjiang to collectively enforce public morals (Ayubi 1991). Mädinä and Mälikä 
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revealed that they never smoked cigarettes in public, although both were addicted to 
nicotine owing to the nature of hostess work. They explained that if Uyghurs in the 
community saw a girl smoking in public, they immediately labelled her a ‘prostitute’.  
 
Previously, hostesses had been easily recognisable since they had worn make-up and 
clothes that more obviously evoked the industry; recently, however, hostesses tended to 
look just like university students, using very little make-up and dressing in casual clothes. 
It has therefore become harder to tell whether a Uyghur girl out with a Han male in the 
evening is a hostess, his romantic partner, or his work colleague.
12
 Nonetheless, my 
respondents lived in acute fear of another Uyghur seeing them emerge from a karaoke bar, 
an institution recognised across China as an illicit den of immoral activity (cf. Jeffreys 
1997: 49-50; Jeffreys 2004: 95). Khalidä related:   
 
Once, another hostess and I were coming home from a bar at about midnight, 
Xinjiang time.
13
 I bumped straight into a [Uyghur] friend, who was out with 
her boyfriend. I don’t know if she saw me coming out of there. I lied and said 
I had been to call on another friend at home …The trouble is, as soon as one 
person sees you, they tell someone else, and then that person tells someone 
else… You have to do what you can to not get seen. I’m afraid of being seen 
even by Uyghurs who don’t know me. Because they look at you as if to say 
‘What are you doing out at this hour?’ 
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The problem is not only of where but at what time a Uyghur girl is seen on the street, 
particularly if she is unaccompanied by a suitable male escort. ‘Decent’ Uyghur girls are 
subject to an evening curfew by parents, who are increasingly anxious to protect urban 
daughters from immoral pursuits in a rapidly modernising city. In order to prevent their 
parents coming to know of their activities, many hostesses would join forces. Mädinä and 
Mälikä explained how girls would tell their parents they were having a sleepover at a 
female friend’s house on a given night, then take turns to stay at one another’s homes, so 
that no one set of parents became overly suspicious on observing their daughter’s late 
return every night.  
 
The fact that, despite working in close proximity with Han clients, Khalidä used Xinjiang 
rather than Beijing time tells us much about the strength of her ethnic identity. In 2012-13, 
even some Uyghurs who work at the People’s Courts in Ürümchi, a state institution 
which officially uses Beijing time, persist in using Xinjiang time (personal 
communication, Tim Grose). This suggests that workplace interaction with Han Chinese 
does not in itself determine whether an individual uses Xinjiang or Beijing time; rather, 
their level of ethnic consciousness does. Indeed, the obstinacy among Uyghurs in using 
local Xinjiang time may even have contributed to its increased use among Han residents. 
Visitors to the region have observed that some Han-managed hotels in Ürümchi now use 
Xinjiang time for check-in purposes (personal communication, Tim Grose). 
 
The acute social stigma attached to the hostess industry meant that most urban Uyghurs 
were keen to disassociate themselves – and their social sub-group – from the activity. 
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Social divides of rural-urban, north-south and oasis origin, as well as minkaohan-
minkaomin (Chinese- or Uyghur-educated) background were invoked to effect this. 
Räwiä, a minkaohan state employee in her forties, asserted that most hostesses in 
Ürümchi are from south Xinjiang or Ghulja (Yining, another northern city), insisting: 
‘Ürümchi Uyghurs don’t work here, they work in China proper. Nobody knows them 
there. The southerners can work in Ürümchi without fear of bumping into relatives or 
neighbours’.  
 
Some members of the community suggested that it was predominantly urban minkaohan 
(Chinese-educated) girls who hostess. Tahirjan, a migrant worker in his thirties from 
Aqsu in south Xinjiang, argued:  
 
Uyghur girls in this city grow up alongside Han girls, who mess about with 
their [Han] male classmates. Uyghur girls are influenced by them. You know, 
just as a blackened cooking pot leaves your hands black if you touch it. The 
Uyghur girls become ‘broken’ [Uy. buzuq, i.e. lose their virginity] and before 
you know it, they’re on the game [involved in sex work]. 
 
The implication is that the behaviour of Uyghur minkaohan may over time be affected by 
the more liberal gender relations they observe among their Han peers in the classroom. 
The latter are more likely to embark on romantic relationships while still in education; 
conversely, school-aged Uyghurs are routinely instructed by parents to avoid romantic 
relationships until they enter the world of work.  
 17 
 
However, in my conversations with female minkaohan in Ürümchi, the suggestion that it 
is mainly minkaohan who hostess was firmly rejected. Gülshäm, a highly acculturated 
minkaohan aged twenty (who spoke very little Uyghur), protested vigorously: ‘Hostesses 
come from Uyghur-medium schools. Girls from Chinese-medium schools don’t do that, 
no way!’ She appeared extremely uncomfortable discussing this in the presence of her 
father, a minkaohan educated during the Cultural Revolution period, who conversed 
mainly in Chinese. Gülshäm asserted that such girls have a low educational level (Ch. 
wenhua shuiping), and thus have few other occupational paths open to them. Her 
comment corroborates the growing body of data pointing to an adverse employment 
environment for young urban Uyghurs, particularly those who lack fluency in Chinese. 
Gülshäm also blamed damaged family relations, arguing that most girls involved in 
hostess work had not received a solid family education and had ‘gone off the rails’ as a 
result. According to this argument, then, it is not linguistic acculturation - development of 
Mandarin Chinese as first language, and resultant familiarity with Han culture - that leads 
young Uyghur girls to engage in inappropriate interaction with Han men, but a poor state 
education (the result of financial constraints associated with a one-parent family) 
combined with a poor family education (the result of an absent parent).   
 
The data gathered on the five hostesses interviewed for this study confirm much of what 
minkaohan respondents had to say, with one exception. While the hostesses confirmed 
that Uyghur girls will usually take hostess work in locations other than their hometown, 
all five were themselves Ürümchi-born and working in Ürümchi. The fact that they had 
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ended up undertaking this activity potentially under the noses of Uyghur relatives, 
neighbours and friends is likely a measure of the depth of desperation each had felt. 
Having lost (in one way or another) the male provider in the family, none had been able 
to enter university (where they would have been formally trained in Mandarin Chinese in 
the first year), and all had consequently struggled to subsist in an urban labour market 
that rejects all but the most heavily acculturated ethnic minority candidates. In this, the 
testimonies of minkaohan respondents - that hostesses hail from broken families and from 
minkaomin educational backgrounds (and are therefore disadvantaged in the job market) - 
ring clear and true. As the result of a departed parent, resultant financial difficulties, and a  
prematurely halted education, all five girls in this study had had to resort to hostess work, 
which in turn had led to severe conflicts of personal and group identity. The personal 
shame and social stigma attached to the hostessing profession by the Uyghur community, 
particularly in an environment charged with inter-ethnic tension, had driven them even to 
contemplate taking their own lives.  
 
Yet each had subsequently picked herself up, dusted herself down, and determined 
to ‘use’ the hostess industry as a means to improve her future social position and 
that of her ethnic group, as we shall see below. The fact that the girls spoke mainly 
in Chinese or code-switched when talking about the details of the hostessing 
profession demonstrates that they placed this activity firmly in a Han linguistic and 
cultural frame of reference, creating a moral distance; that the girls reverted to 
speaking entirely in Uyghur when describing their feelings or when distressed 
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suggests on the other hand that they derived a sense of cultural belonging and 
emotional comfort from the use of the mother tongue.  
 
Reconfiguring morality: religious and ethno-political boundaries 
Any study centred on Uyghur hostesses who work with Han clients must address the 
question of morality management, in both religious and ethno-political terms. Certainly, 
religious considerations were frequently cited by urban Uyghurs in their censure of the 
profession. Dilbär, for instance, described her mother’s reaction on seeing a Uyghur girl 
standing outside a bar with a Han male: ‘My mum was furious. Because those places 
aren’t halal; and she was going inside… with a Han!’ But how do hostesses reconcile 
themselves with the Islamic component of their identities?  
 
In her studies of rural migrant hostesses in China proper, Zheng Tiantian used the phrase 
‘new moral vision’ to describe how Han respondents fundamentally revised standards of 
right and wrong with regard to Confucian mores of female propriety. Within that vision, 
the deliberate commodification of romance, the body and intimacy is ‘transformed from a 
denigration of female virtue into a route to empowerment’ (Zheng 2008, 459). This 
process takes place in a context where rural hostesses have learned from painful 
experience that female purity is appreciated neither by urban men nor by society at large.  
Within orthodox Islamic law (including Sunni schools of jurisprudence), marriage is the 
central institution for ‘sanctioned erotic pleasure.’ As such, it defines premarital and 
extramarital sex – by men and women - as practices defiling the sanctity of the marital 
union (Gutiérrez 2012, 156). Because of the shame attached to an unmarried Muslim 
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woman ‘opening her face’ to a man who is not a blood relative, my respondents struggled 
with their conscience when entering the industry, and that struggle continued well beyond 
the first act of religious ‘betrayal’. Mädinä and Mälikä confirmed that they had bitterly 
reproached themselves at first, on the grounds that they were Muslims. Mädinä described 
how she had studied at a religious school (Uy. mäktäp) when she was of primary school 
age, and had kneeled behind her grandmother as the latter prayed. She retained a crystal 
clear memory of her grandmother’s loud and sonorous intonation of the prayers (Uy. 
namaz). Both girls denied any suggestion that they enjoyed the recreation afforded by 
hostess work (an admission made by some Han hostesses, see Gil et al. 1996, 144), and 
both vowed to give up drinking and smoking once they had earned enough money to 
change career, stating: ‘That will be a new start in every way.’ 
 
According to convention, a hostess can refuse to perform genital or oral sex acts (Zheng 
2004, 128). This creates an important means for Uyghur hostesses to draw moral 
boundaries, based on religion, in relation both to Han clients and to Han hostesses. 
Mädinä grimaced as she explained: ‘Some clients want to grope (Ch. luanmo) your 
breasts and thighs, or kiss you; but not all [Uyghur] girls will do that.’ Mälikä, for 
example, reported that she did not ‘go off stage’, and never allowed clients to ‘maul’ her. 
While her customers sometimes lost their temper as a result, for Mälikä, this produced a 
good result, since they would frequently decide that she was ‘too prim and proper’ and 
dismiss her after paying the basic fee. Although some customers offered her as much as 
10,000 yuan for sex – calling it ‘an investment for her future’ - she always refused. As 
she noted: ‘It’s important to be a virgin in Uyghur culture. If the family of the groom 
 21 
finds you’re not a virgin on your wedding night, it’s a big problem.’ I would suggest that, 
in fiercely protecting their chastity vis-à-vis Han clients, my respondents deliberately 
underlined ethnic and religious group membership. Thus, Mälikä was in a position to 
assert: ‘I don’t believe I have let myself down in any way […] I have nothing to reproach 
myself for.’ She succeeded in ‘taking the moral high ground’ while simultaneously 
‘occupying the economic low ground’, to borrow Otis’ (2008: 370) phrase. 
 
While it appears that some Uyghur hostesses, possibly those who are hardened to the 
character of the industry, are less strict with regard to sexual fondling, even they maintain 
certain limits. Tunisa complained of ‘uneducated and lewd’ Han customers, who would 
‘maul’ a girl without even speaking to her. While she admitted that once drunk (an 
occupational hazard), she might let clients touch her breasts or kiss her cheek, she was 
clear that she would never allow a Han client to kiss her mouth, because ‘they are not 
Muslims and they eat pork.’ Mädinä gave the same reason for her refusal to sleep with 
Han clients, raising the further problem that Han clients are not circumcised. This 
culturally conservative behaviour often caused Han hostesses to remark that the Uyghur 
girls did not know how to have fun [Ch. bu hui wanr]. At such times, Mädinä and Mälikä 
would evoke the counter-stereotype that Han people are introverts and killjoys, a charge 
based on the relative disinclination among Han people to perform (dance) for others 
(Smith Finley 2013a). Where a Uyghur hostess did consent to sleep with a Han client, 
that individual often had an extraordinary motivation. Khalidä slept (as a virgin) with a 
Han client out of desperation to raise money for her brother’s medical care. A friend of 
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Mädinä’s slept with Han clients regularly because she had epilepsy, and needed money to 
purchase her medication.  
 
On the other hand, some Uyghur hostesses occasionally slept with a Muslim client, 
though this was rarely with the intent of earning money alone. As Zheng notes, ‘ideal’ 
exit strategies for Han hostesses include becoming an independent businesswoman, 
marrying a client, or becoming the mistress (Ch. ernai) of a wealthy client (2004, 142). 
These strategies hovered also in the minds of my respondents. I have earlier described 
Mädinä’s aspiration to buy a car and become a private-hire driver. She also mentioned 
that she had come to genuinely care for certain of her Muslim clients, and to hope she 
might have a future with them. For instance, while hostessing in Kunming, she had met a 
Turkish jade merchant. As she related:  
 
I didn’t sleep with him right away, only after I’d ‘sat’ with him four or five 
times. But then I slept with him for 1500 yuan, and he got a bad impression of 
me, thinking I did that sort of thing all the time. But I genuinely liked him, so 
the second time I slept with him I didn’t take his money. And his attitude 
began to change.  
 
On another occasion in Ürümchi, Mädinä had become acquainted with a Tajik client from 
Central Asia, who worked as a commercial airline pilot. She confessed that she had 
‘utterly fallen for him’, and, again, slept with him for no charge:  
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He really liked me. You know, Islam allows men to take four or five wives? 
Well, he had a wife in Tajikistan. But he wanted to make me his second wife 
and ‘keep’ me in a flat here in Ürümchi. He said I wouldn’t need to hostess 
any longer, that he would pay for everything I needed.  
 
Mädinä had even taken this lover back to her grandfather’s house (Uy. chong öy), 
although she had not dared to tell the old man the truth, introducing the pilot only 
as a ‘friend’.  In this way, Uyghur hostesses sometimes sought to render their 
activities ‘sustainable in ethical terms’ and emotionally bearable by keeping a 
regular client with whom they had the possibility of a long-term relationship, a 
strategy also observed in southeast Asia (cf. Lindquist 2010: 297). 
 
One might surmise that the religious boundaries drawn by these hostesses in relation to 
Han clients are the natural outcome of a minkaomin education, assumed to be less 
secularised than an education received in Mandarin Chinese. Yet the reality is far less 
clear-cut. For one thing, although minkaomin students received their education in the 
Uyghur language from native Uyghur teachers, the curriculum they studied will likely 
have been as devoid of religious content as that studied in minkaohan classrooms. It is 
more likely that the hostesses’ religious knowledge was absorbed in the family home 
during childhood, as in the case of Mädinä’s observations of her grandmother. 
Furthermore, that knowledge will have deepened in the current climate of re-Islamisation 
in the Uyghur community at large. At the time when I interviewed the girls, Mädinä’s 
stepmother (her grandfather’s second wife) had embarked on a self-taught Quranic 
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education, and prayed by herself at home five times a day. I had never observed this 
person pray over the fifteen months I knew her back in 1996. Another explanation is that 
the religious boundary put in place when dealing with Han clients is to at least some 
extent politically motivated. After all, it can disappear when interacting with a Muslim 
client, although Islam strictly proscribes pre-marital and extra-marital sex. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have documented the backgrounds and experiences of Uyghur hostesses 
in Ürümchi, and explored how they make sense of social, ethnic and religious identities. 
Based on my limited sample of five case studies, there is no evidence to suggest, as some 
members of the Uyghur community argue, that hostesses originate particularly from rural 
or urban Xinjiang, or from north or south. What does emerge is that girls can work more 
easily when operating outside of their hometown, since this allows them to evade the 
social supervision of parents and communities. Even so, this does not prevent some 
Uyghur hostesses from working in their home cities when in severe financial straits, as 
my case studies demonstrate: all five women are Ürümchi-born.  
 
Regarding the popular assertion that minkaohan (Chinese-educated) women are more 
likely to enter this profession, data collected for this study casts doubt. It appears that 
better-educated and highly acculturated minkaohan are more likely than minkaomin to 
consider a genuine romantic relationship with Han schoolmates or colleagues. My earlier 
study on Uyghur-Han inter-ethnic courtship corroborates this claim (Smith Finley 2013b). 
However, minkaohan assign the ‘immoral’ world of hostessing firmly to the socially 
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‘damaged’ (those from broken families) and to minkaomin, whom they perceive as less 
well educated owing to their only partial fluency in Chinese and their education in less 
well-funded Uyghur-medium schools. It is notable that all five women interviewed for 
this study hail from broken families and are minkaomin.  
 
At a time when a strict community taboo outlaws Uyghur-Han intermarriage, what does it 
mean when Uyghur females consent to work in close proximity to Han males in a 
sexually liberal environment? How far does it signal the collapse of inter-ethnic 
boundaries constructed by Uyghurs to claim cultural and moral superiority vis-a-vis Han 
Chinese? My sample suggests that young Uyghur women become involved in hostessing 
at times of severe economic need, often following the loss of the family head through 
death or divorce. They rarely have a university degree, although some use income from 
hostessing to fund university studies in the present or future. Having no degree, they fall 
victim to ethnically ordered  employment discrimination in Han-dominated urban 
Xinjiang, where Han employers prefer Uyghur minkaohan (Chinese-educated) candidates 
over minkaomin (Uyghur-educated) candidates, and many will not countenance hiring 
Uyghurs at all. These young women resort to hostess work in the absence of more gainful 
employment, or in addition to their day job, as a means to pay the bills, become socially 
mobile, or amass disposable income.  
 
For my Ürümchi respondents, as for Zheng’s (2004, 2008) Han rural migrant hostesses, 
the industry is a temporary means to an end. Fully aware that their ethnic group is 
disadvantaged by employment realities in urban Xinjiang, these young Uyghur women 
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justify what is seen by the broader Uyghur community (especially males) as an act of 
‘ethnic betrayal’ as a defendable drive for upward social mobility. A key point to emerge 
is the gap between simply subsisting and having disposable income that might be 
invested towards personal social improvement (and, by extension, improvement of the 
social position of the Uyghur ethnic group). This may take the form of ownership of 
material/consumer goods, establishment of an independent business, or the pursuit of a 
white-collar career. Surrounded by Han peers who are better off and better able to 
consume a range of aesthetically pleasing products, some young Uyghur women aspire to 
do the same. For those who lack full fluency in Chinese or a sufficiently high level of 
education, the ‘rice bowl of youth’ (Ch. qingchun fan 青春饭, Wang 2000: 73) may be 
viewed as the only way to achieve this. Hostess work simultaneously constitutes a moral 
‘sacrifice’ (here, a crossing of ethnic and religious boundaries) and a ‘stepping stone’ 
towards a young Uyghur woman’s life goals (cf. Zheng 2007). 
 
So what does the decision to enter the hostess industry say about these young women’s 
sense of ethnic identity, and how do their experiences within that industry further impact 
on their level of ethnic awareness? Below I will discuss factors mitigating towards a 
weak and negative ethnic identity before going on to assess those that suggest a strong 
and positive one. First, a core contingency leading to a potentially negative ethnic 
identity is the nature of these girls’ broken family background. Several have been 
affected by heroin abuse among male relatives, including brothers and boyfriends. While 
this pathology can to a degree be seen sympathetically as the Uyghur male response to 
dwindling chances since the 1990s of political independence, for female relatives it 
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translates into an absence of male support and dependability and a severely compromised 
financial situation. Some fathers may be absent owing to arrest (even execution) for 
becoming involved in political separatist activities. Again, while a sympathetic view 
might cast these men as honourable martyrs, their actions may be viewed by Uyghur 
women (traditionally more practical when it comes to questions of the Uyghurs’ future 
within the Chinese nation-state) as a failure to put family before ethno-national politics. 
The girls interviewed for this study had also formed negative views of Uyghur menfolk - 
and possibly of norms governing male-female interaction within Uyghur culture – as a 
result of their abuse by male relatives and boyfriends, and the fact of continuing high 
levels of divorce in Uyghur society.  
 
Another potential source of low self-esteem among these girls is the ethnic discrimination 
suffered by all Uyghurs in the spheres of language use, education and employment, 
although this may conversely lead to a strengthening of ethnic awareness (see below). 
Having once entered the hostess industry (and decided to stay there despite the possibility 
of getting work in the service industries), it could be argued that these girls value 
consumer goods and money over their ethnic dignity. Indeed, the fact that they 
knowingly continue to place themselves in a position where some Han clients will subject 
them to ethnically-based humiliation could be construed as a sign of low self-esteem in 
group terms - and frequently is construed as such by male members of the Uyghur 
community. 
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Yet my sample also produced much evidence to the contrary. The girls’ deep awareness 
of Islamic cultural mores, their keen desire to conceal their night-time activities from 
their families and the Uyghur community, and their deployment of a superior cultural 
morality in the face of Han clients and Han hostesses suggests a robust Uyghur ethnic 
identity, in which religion is the core element. Their indignation when faced with ethnic 
discrimination in the labour market demonstrates a keen awareness of inter-ethnic 
inequality. Meanwhile, their determination to do whatever it takes to better themselves, 
support their families, and achieve upward mobility suggests a strong sense of self-
respect at both the individual and the group level. Khalidä described how some Han 
customers would tell Uyghur hostesses that they should ‘forget any idea of taking an 
equal place in this society’. Yet when I asked whether she ended up believing them, she 
was clear: ‘No. We have to do whatever we can to educate ourselves and match them.’ 
Mälikä’s response was equally defiant: ‘If you believe them, that’s the end of self-
confidence, and the end of any chance of bettering yourself’. Asked whether they 
considered themselves ‘servants to the Han’ (as charged by many Uyghur males), Mädinä 
and Mälikä’s counter-argument was convincing: ‘Well, even if we work somewhere else 
scrubbing dishes or making beds, aren’t we still being servants to the Han? What’s the 
difference?’ Furthermore, the more savvy of the five took advantage of the hostess 
scenario to reverse the ethnic hierarchy and mock unwitting Han males on both linguistic 
and cultural levels. The position taken up by the girls in my sample is perhaps most 
neatly described in this final comment from Khalidä: 
 
Where is my sense of ethnic self-respect? Everything I’ve done, I’ve done for 
my brother, my mother and my sisters. What will happen to us, to me, if I 
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don’t do this work? If I don’t get myself a college education, how will I 
support my family? If my cultural level remains low, how will it be for my 
family, for Uyghurs as an ethnic group? We will always be inferior! What 
I’m doing is the best I can do, for myself, and for the Uyghurs as a group. 
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1
 While courtship and marriage with an out-group member (non-Muslim) are frequently frowned upon in 
Muslim societies, it is important to note that romantic and sexual relations with an in-group (Muslim) man 
are equally proscribed when taking place prior to marriage. 
2
 Sanpei denotes ‘three accompaniments’, and refers variously to chatting, singing, dancing, lighting of 
cigarettes (and smoking), and pouring of drinks (and drinking). It may also include heavy petting or sex. Cf. 
Jeffreys 1997, 50; Xin 1999, 1412, 1427-8; Wang 2000, 74; Sun 2002, 191; Otis 2008, 366. 
3
 Respondents’ names are changed to protect their identities. 
4
 Until quite recently, a bride’s mother-in-law would check the marital sheets for blood on the morning 
after a wedding. My Uyghur respondents in the mid-1990s acknowledged the continuation of this practice 
in some families, and described how a bridegroom might cut himself and let his own blood onto the sheets 
to protect his bride’s honour (Smith 1999). While young Uyghurs tend to deny the existence of this practice 
in the 2000s (personal communication, Tim Grose), in some cases this may stem from a desire to appear 
‘modern’.  
5
 While middle school education is free (no tuition fees), the miscellaneous costs relating to uniforms, 
books and other materials may prevent some Uyghur families from sending their children to school. 
6
 For similar cases in which Han women became hostesses after being humiliated by their lover’s family 
and/or abandoned by their lover, see Zheng 2008, 457-8. 
7
 This is common practice throughout China, reflecting the marketisation of healthcare in the reform era. 
This particular refusal did not occur because the patient was a drug addict, nor because he was a Uyghur 
(i.e. it was not based on social or ethnic discrimination).       
8
 In 2012 and 2013, increasing numbers of Uyghur female street cleaners could be observed on Xinhua 
nanlu and Gongyuan beilu in Ürümchi, areas dominated by Han residents (personal communication, Tim 
Grose). This suggests that adverse socio-economic circumstances in Uyghur families (where males suffer a 
high unemployment rate) are increasingly driving the womenfolk to take formerly unthinkable work roles. 
It is instructive that such work is being undertaken in Han rather than Uyghur residential areas, implying a 
desire to avoid the negative social stigma attached to it by the Uyghur community. 
9
 Probably, Mädinä’s boyfriend would not have allowed her to do hostess work (open her face to men), 
even had she wanted to. However, I did hear of occasional cases where male partners – Han and Uyghur - 
encouraged their girlfriends to augment the couple’s income through hostessing. 
10
 See also Hasmath 2012, who provides statistical data on labour choices among urban Uyghurs. 
11
 Respondents were paid 100 yuan per hour of interview, a ‘wage’ consistent with that they would have 
earned while hostessing. 
12
 It should be noted that, for some Uyghurs, there is little difference (in terms of shame) between 
‘accompanying’ a Han male for money and embarking on a genuine, romantic relationship with him.  
13
 ‘Xinjiang time’, which is two hours behind ‘Beijing time’, is the local time corresponding to the 
topographical position of the XUAR, and is used by Uyghurs and other Central Asian groups who consider 
themselves indigenous to the region (Smith 2002; Bellér-Hann 2002; Bovingdon 2010; Smith Finley 
2013a).  
 
 
